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THE CASE FOR DATA PRIVACY RIGHTS (OR, PLEASE,
A LITTLE OPTIMISM)
Margot E. Kaminski*
Oh, the tragicomedy of privacy law: just as lawmakers in the
United States have started to establish basic data privacy rights
recognized the world over, the bulk of privacy law scholarship has
conceded that these rights, or their close analogues, are useless.1
© 2022 Margot E. Kaminski. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review
Reflection, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, Colorado Law; Director, Privacy Initiative, Silicon
Flatirons Center; Affiliated Fellow, Information Society Project at Yale Law School. Thanks
to: Meg Leta Jones, Harry Surden, Woodrow Hartzog, Neil Richards, and many others for
influencing my work. Mistakes and obstinance are my own.
1 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1930 (2013)
[hereinafter Cohen, What Privacy is For] (“[T]he new privacy governance is particularly illequipped to respond effectively to emerging practices of modulation. Its emphasis on
privatized regulation and control of information flows via notice and choice reinforces
precisely those aspects of modulation that are most troubling and most intractable.”); Julie
E. Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. UNIV.
(Mar. 23, 2021) [hereinafter Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law], https://
knightcolumbia.org/content/how-not-to-write-a-privacy-law
[https://perma.cc/DY8JJH44] (“Atomistic, post hoc assertions of individual control rights, however, cannot
meaningfully discipline networked processes that operate at scale.”); Woodrow Hartzog,
The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 423, 425 (2018) (“The
idealisation of control in modern data protection regimes . . . creates a pursuit that is
actively harmful and adversarial to safe and sustainable data practices. It deludes us about
the efficacy of rules and dooms future regulatory proposals to walk down the same,
misguided path.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1607, 1660 (1999) (“[T]he critical problem with the model of privacy-as-control is that it
has not proved capable of generating the kinds of public, quasi-public, and private spaces
necessary to promote democratic self-rule.”); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy SelfManagement and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013) (“[P]rivacy selfmanagement is certainly a laudable and necessary component of any regulatory regime, I
contend that it is being tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities. Privacy selfmanagement does not provide people with meaningful control over their data.”); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Privacy, Practice, and Performance, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 5) (“One set of weaknesses stems from the laws’ individual rights approach,
which is not only based on faulty assumptions, but also entrenches performances that are
inherently mismatched against the structural harms of informational capitalism. The
performative nature of individual rights in privacy law, which has habituated us into
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Rights of notice, access, correction, even opt out—people won’t know
they have these rights and certainly won’t often use them. Companies
that must operationalize these rights will operationalize the weakest
versions. Grounding data privacy law in individual rights fatally
ignores the social scale of data privacy harms.2 Grounding data privacy
law in individual rights relies on malleable, manipulable, cognitively
overloaded individuals to do the heavy work of regulating. Grounding
data privacy law in individual rights will fail.
This Essay makes the case, nonetheless, for including individual
rights in data privacy laws. Individual rights are not sufficient by
themselves, but they are necessary for data privacy. These rights reflect
common and historic understandings of data privacy and why it
matters to many. They instantiate the dignitary and autonomy theories
of privacy that form the basis of privacy rights around the world. They
may help insulate data privacy laws from First Amendment challenges.
And they also serve an overlooked role as a component of
governance—a necessary aspect of institutional design. That is, the
version of data privacy law that drops individual rights entirely and
focuses only on centralized, often ex ante governance will encounter
predictable problems that individual rights can in fact help resolve.
We give up on individual rights at our peril. It’s not clear data privacy
laws will be enacted, or succeed at regulating, without them.
First, some background for the uninitiated. Most data privacy
laws—in contrast with, say, privacy torts or prohibitions on
wiretapping—are built on a scaffolding of individual procedural rights
known as the Fair Information Practices (FIPs).3 These rights aim to
establish a kind of data due process for individuals whose information
is gathered, held, processed, and used by often powerful entities.4 The
thinking managing our privacy is an individual’s responsibility, has also allowed industry to
weaponize our exercise of those rights to undermine our privacy.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, The
New Privacy Law, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 19, 38 (2021) (“To the extent that second
wave privacy laws offer individuals additional rights to access, correct, delete, and port
information, they sit within a long tradition of privacy laws focused on atomistic personal
autonomy and choice. Most scholars agree that this conception of privacy is outdated and
incompatible with today’s information ecosystem.”).
2 See Salomé Viljoen, A Relational Theory of Data Governance, 131 YALE L.J. 573 (2021).
3 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS xxiii (1973) [hereinafter HEW REPORT]; OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti
/ieconomy
/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm [https:
//perma.cc/6YQN-933W]; see also Fair Information Practice Principles, IAPP, https:/
/iapp.org/resources/article/fair-information-practices/ [https://perma.cc/N8FT-FJ5P].
4 See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249 (2008); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data
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FIPs’ origin story is debatable; they appear to have originated in
parallel in several countries around the same time.5 But their impact
is unmistakable. Nearly every country around the world with a data
privacy law—and there are a lot of them—has structured that law at its
core around the FIPs.6
In the United States, the FIPs were conceived of as a solution to a
tough theoretical problem. U.S. privacy law largely did not recognize
an expectation of privacy in information once an individual voluntarily
shared it.7 But data processing as a practice raised concerns even if
information was initially obtained with permission.8 Information
could be used out of context. It could be erroneous or out of date. It
could be used in ways that fail to comport with social values. It could
trap people within stigmatized identities not of their own making. It
could enable manipulation and even violence. Data processing raised
concerns in the 1970s about power imbalances, opacity, and
accountability that sound on the whole very much like the policy
conversations of today.9
The proposed solution, back in 1973, was to rebalance the power
ledger through a focus on procedural fairness.10 If companies and
government agencies would not negotiate the terms of data use with
individuals, then individuals would have to be affirmatively afforded
certain rights. Thus, the FIPs were born (at least, one version was
born) on this side of the Atlantic: a right to be notified of data
collection and processing, a right of access to one’s data, and a right
of individual participation that could include correction, deletion, and
even opt out. There were affirmative obligations for companies, too,
like obligations to identify what the data would be used for, minimize
data collection, store data securely, and keep data accurate and up to
date. But the core of the FIPs are its individual data privacy process
and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93
(2014); Margot E. Kaminski & Jennifer M. Urban, The Right to Contest AI, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. 1957 (2021).
5 See Frederik Johannes Zuiderveen Borgesius, Improving Privacy Protection in the
Area of Behavioural Targeting 134–35 (Dec. 17, 2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Amsterdam) (UvA-DARE).
6 For example, Article 5 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) lays out
its version of the FIPs principles, which are furthered elsewhere in the GDPR. Council
Regulation 2016/679, art. 5, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 35–36 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]; see also
Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115,
128 (2017); Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771 (2019).
7 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
8 See Kaminski & Urban, supra note 4, at 1994–97; HEW REPORT, supra note 3, at 167–
68.
9 See Kaminski & Urban, supra note 4, at 1970, 1994–96; HEW REPORT, supra note 3,
at 167–68.
10 See Kaminski & Urban, supra note 4, at 1994–96; HEW REPORT, supra note 3, at
xxiv–xxv.
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rights: notice and access, coupled with a (limited) opportunity to be
heard.11
The FIPs are about fairness. They are not about protecting against
the gathering and circulation of substantively sensitive data. They are
thus complimentary to, not replacements for, a more substantive
privacy tort regime. They are frustratingly vague, and readily made
hollow.12 They also get to the individual core of data privacy, its focus
on dignity and autonomy in the face of vast power disparities. Lose the
FIPs, and we lose the thread that has tied the data privacy project
together. We lose, in short, what motivates many to call for data privacy
law.
A number of sectoral U.S. laws operationalize the FIPs.13 So do
data protection laws (data privacy laws) around the world.14 But until
only very recently, the United States lacked a general comprehensive
data privacy law. Only in the past few years have several U.S. states
begun enacting comprehensive data privacy laws structured around
the FIPs’ individual rights.15 Several of these laws, while enacted, have
yet to even go into effect. They are far from equivalent to EU data
protection law, and certainly have significant shortcomings. Yet here
we are, with data privacy rights now squarely within the Overton
Window and a host of privacy scholars claiming that they cannot and
will not ever work.
How did we get here?
Largely, we got to this place through the mess that is U.S. privacy
law. The United States has long relied on a watered-down version of
data privacy rights known as “notice and choice.”16 Notice and choice
is precisely not what it sounds like. Individuals are given little notice,

11 See Meg Leta Jones & Margot E. Kaminski, An American’s Guide to the GDPR, 98
DENV. L. REV. 93, 97–99 (2020).
12 See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD.
L. REV. 952, 964–77 (2017).
13 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936, 2033–34 (1996); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–02 (2018); 16 C.F.R.
§ 312.2, 312.3 (2016) (“Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act” or “COPPA”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b (2018) (“Fair Credit Reporting Act” or “FCRA”); Hartzog, supra note 12, at 953–
54; Jones & Kaminski, supra note 11, at 99 (“While the FIPs are no panacea, they form the
backbone of data protection laws, or data privacy laws, both within the United States and
around the world.”).
14 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 772–75.
15 Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy
Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1767 (2021) (“[T]he CCPA is not modeled on the GDPR,
though both share similarities founded in the long-established Fair Information Practice
Principles.”).
16 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo
Economicus, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 261–62 (2014).
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and next to no choice.17 Anybody who has ever visited a website
without reading the privacy policy, or contemplated quitting a social
network but found themselves pulled back in by the vortex of their
peers, can tell you how well notice and choice has been working. Not
well. The individual at the center of U.S. privacy law failed us because
she wasn’t actually given real rights to begin with.
It has also become common to recognize our very human foibles.
Even if we were given real control, it would fail. Humans have limited
time and attention spans and known cognitive biases.18 We drown in
choice overload. We are misled by choice architecture. The very core
of us is malleable, and companies and political campaigns knowingly
exploit that.19 To hang our hat on individual rights or individual
consent would serve not as privacy protection but as “privacy washing.”
Companies would be able to pretty much keep doing what they have
always done, but now they could argue that they were doing it with our
permission.20
So why not focus, instead, on setting substantive rules for data
uses?21 Talk about the trust we place in information intermediaries,
and the corresponding duties we are owed.22 Mandate certain
elements of technological design and prohibit others.23 Recognize
that the much-touted individual is not the only unit of analysis that
matters—that population-level impacts should be our focus, and
17 NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 174, 176 (2022) (describing the
“pathological ‘notice and choice’ regime governing data practices” and observing that “the
American regime of ‘privacy self-management’ . . . puts the legal responsibility squarely on
‘users’ of services to make ‘choices’ about their privacy after ‘notice’ from the company in
the form of a privacy policy, many of which pull off the impressive linguistic feat of being
both vague and dense at the same time, saying a lot without really saying anything at all”).
18 See Hartzog, supra note 12, at 969–70; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1488–89 (2019).
19 See Cohen, What Privacy Is For, supra note 1, at 1917.
20 Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, supra note 1 (“Current approaches to
crafting privacy legislation are heavily influenced by the antiquated private law ideal of
bottom-up governance via assertion of individual rights, and that approach, in turn,
systematically undermines prospects for effective governance of networked processes that
operate at scale.”).
21 See id. (noting that enforcement “efforts do not reliably produce lasting behavioral
change unless they are paired with more specific mandates,” and referring to the “hole at
the center where substantive standards ought to be”).
22 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11
(2020); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183 (2016); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH.
U. L. REV. 961 (2021); Claudia E. Haupt, Platforms as Trustees: Information Fiduciaries and the
Value of Analogy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 34 (2020); Andrew F. Tuch, A General Defense of
Information Fiduciaries, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1897 (2021). But see Lina M. Khan & David E.
Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019).
23 See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 57–58 (2018).

390

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

[VOL. 97:5

democratic governance our aim.24 It’s not that all of this is wrong—it’s
not! It’s largely right!—but somehow it has been framed in opposition
to the individual rights that made data privacy appealing in the first
place.
The remainder of this Essay makes the case for why individual data
privacy rights are necessary. It admits that data privacy rights are not
sufficient by themselves. But if we are going to shift to a more
regulatory approach to data privacy, we need to be mindful of what is
lost if we give up on individual rights. The loss would be a matter of
rhetoric, a matter of motivation, a matter of rights balancing, and
perhaps most overlooked, a matter of institutional design. This Essay
offers an important counterfactual—not the data privacy laws of our
dreams, for sure, but what current state data privacy laws would look
like if we gave up on individual rights.
First: individual rights reflect what most people think of when they
think of privacy. When somebody signs onto a social network, they
aren’t thinking “Gee, I really trust these guys.”25 They’re not thinking,
“Gee, I hope this site has been cleared of dark patterns.”26 They’re
thinking “Gee, I hope they’re not watching me when I do that.” Or
“Gee, I wish I could stop them from sharing this information with my
employer, or my girlfriend.” Or “Gee, I wish I knew what they were
collecting and doing with all that information.”
Privacy has historically and theoretically centered on the
individual self. The autonomy version of privacy focuses on freedom,
choice, and control.27 The dignitary version of privacy focuses on
preventing objectification and preserving personhood.28 There are
flaws in each of these characterizations, to be sure, but they each have
24 Viljoen, supra note 2, at 650; Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, supra note 1
(“[B]ecause enforcement litigation is predominantly atomistic in its identification and
valuation of harms, it cannot effectively discipline networked phenomena that produce
widely distributed, collective harms manifesting at scale.”).
25 See supra note 22.
26 See generally Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns,
13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43 (2021).
27 See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
28 See, e.g., Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From
Agnostic to Agonistic Machine Learning, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 83, 121 (2019) (“[O]ur
incomputability is in part protected by a practical and actionable right to reject
computation and/or to be computed in alternative ways, underlining the indeterminate
nature of each and every individual person and the ‘equal respect and concern’ that our
governments owe each of them.”); Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC
Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling, 17 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REP. 17, 18 (2001);
Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer
Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216, 231 (2017); Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible:
The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995, 1016–17 (2017); Martha C.
Nussbaum, Objectification, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 249, 256–57 (1995) (arguing that there are
seven forms of objectification).
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a long lineage both here and abroad. And they each resonate through
the metaphors policymakers love to use and scholars love to hate:
privacy as data ownership, and privacy as individual control.29
There are a host of significant problems with characterizing data
as property.30 A perfect right to exclude leads to tragedies of the
commons, while alienation results in a one-time shot at control that
would give up on individual rights that “follow the data.” If we gave
people data property rights, it’s likely we’d end up precisely back where
we are: individuals selling their data for pennies, not thinking of future
risks, and vulnerable minorities exploited and surveilled. This Essay is
certainly not arguing that data rights should be characterized as
property rights, nor that the relationship between individuals and their
personal data is “ownership” in the conventional sense.
But the now common trope of “data ownership” indicates
important things about how many people understand data privacy.
When laypeople talk of data “ownership,” they are not speaking of
establishing monetary incentives to produce a good. They are
referencing an Americanized version of dignity, tracing “ownership”
back to Lockean desert: I deserve to “own” my data because it came
out of my body, my personhood, off my back. Data would be personal
property in the sense Margaret Radin means it: as closely tied to one’s
personhood as a wedding ring, home, or diary; not fungible and
readily alienated.31 Data as property invokes, too, the centrality of
individual control. If I own my car, I have the right to exclude you
from it. If I own my data, I (ideally) control the terms of its sale and
use.
When people talk of “control,” another term privacy scholars now
love to hate, it’s often just a shorthand for autonomy. Control is an
instantiation of freedom, liberty, choice. Of course we don’t actually
control the distribution of our data. Of course we don’t have the
29 RICHARDS, supra note 17, at 90 (“Privacy as Control runs deep in our legal and
cultural understandings of privacy.”); Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, supra note 1
(“[N]one of the bills recently before Congress purports, in so many words, to recognize
property rights in personal data. Even so, almost all adopt a basic structure that is indebted
to property thinking.”); Jacob M. Victor, Commentary, The EU General Data Protection
Regulation: Toward a Property Regime for Protecting Data Privacy, 123 YALE L.J. 513, 518–19
(2013).
30 See, e.g., Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, supra note 1 (“The property
tradition holds that property rights internalize governance incentives and minimize
governance costs by situating authority over resource access and use where it can be
exercised most wisely and effectively. Contemporary property thinkers do recognize that
such an approach can undervalue certain types of collective harms.”); Mark A. Lemley,
Comment, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1547 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy
As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1151–70 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Property,
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2076–94 (2004).
31 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–61
(1982).
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capacity in reality, temporally or cognitively, to rationally monitor and
choose every way our data will be used. Of course companies set the
framing and the terms, which often sets the outcomes; in the words of
the late Ian Kerr, “the devil is in the defaults.”32 But the rhetoric of
autonomy, of control, reflects some very true realities of what privacy,
for many, feels like. It’s the choice of which face to wear for which
audience.33 It’s the choice, for those privileged enough to be able
exercise it, to form our identities.34 It’s the choice of how to modify your
behavior, or not, depending on who you know will be watching.35 This
explains the centrality of notice to most of our privacy laws, from data
privacy laws to wiretapping laws to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Notice, ideally, enables adjustment.36 We manage our boundaries well
only if we know the circumstances in which we set them.37 Or it’s the
lack of choice, the way a lack of privacy freezes us, rendering us
vulnerable, even persecuted, embarrassed, exposed.38
This capacity for boundary management—this constant dance of
a dialectic over how much to reveal and how much to conceal—in
reality does not have a liberal self at the core.39 We are constructed as
much as we do the constructing, and we are intermediated and
modulated and all of the things. But as Julie Cohen has identified, a
central paradox and project of data privacy law is to establish the
circumstances where that liberal self could better exist, even as we

32 Ian Kerr, The Devil Is in the Defaults, 4 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 91 (2017).
33 See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1–16 (1973).
34 RICHARDS, supra note 17, at 6 (“Privacy rules can promote identity formation
because privacy can help us to figure out who we are and what we believe, by ourselves and
with our intimates and confidants.”).
35 See Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113,
1132–35 (2015) (building on the work of social psychologist Irwin Altman in defining
privacy in physical spaces); see generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR (1975); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980)
(“Our interest in privacy . . . is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the
extent to which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to
us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention.”).
36 See Kaminski, supra note 35, at 1136 (“Requiring notice allows the surveillance
subject to recalculate her mechanisms for maintaining an optimized balance of openness
and closedness in a given environment. Notice and consent are thus an important aspect
of many information capture statutes.”).
37 See Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 205
(2017) (“[I]f a person has notice of the recording, whether actual or constructive, she will
be able to recalibrate her behavior accordingly, with the knowledge that it will be seen or
heard by a wider audience. Many recording laws thus have notice requirements; they ban
surreptitious recording but allow recording with notice.”).
38 See Kaminski, supra note 35, at 1133, 1137–38.
39 See Cohen, What Privacy Is For, supra note 1, at 1905.
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acknowledge it foundationally as myth.40 That liberal self is at the
center not just of so many peoples’ conceptions of selfhood but also of
the beautiful twisted fiction of American democracy that has driven
both our policymaking and our jurisprudence in this space—and
drives it still.
Privacy has thus repeatedly, despite scholars’ best efforts, been
characterized as individualized data “ownership” or individualized
control. It has been connected, historically and doctrinally, to the
individual body, to individual shame, to self-construction.41 At the core
of privacy, ultimately, is the self. That self may well be a fiction, but it’s
a fiction that goes down so deep that to root it out is to be left with
serious shambles, both legal and theoretical. Data privacy is in some
ways crucially different from what has historically been characterized
as privacy, but what links the two concepts for the layperson is the
ability to know about and intervene in information flows about one’s
self.42
The recent move away from the self in privacy scholarship is
understandable. Scholars have long acknowledged that privacy
violations produce society-wide harms. Individual privacy harms add
up to the potential death of democracy. Can we rely on individual
decisions to forge a good society? (No.) Salomé Viljoen’s recent
contribution on relational surveillance is brilliant: my decision to stay
on social media affects how online advertisers someday will profile
you.43 We are all connected in this economy, so to conceive of data
privacy only as a series of atomized hierarchical relationships between
the watched and the watcher is to neglect the ways in which my choices
impact yours. Group privacy, too, is underprotected by atomistic
privacy rights; so is privacy in neighborhoods, and in communities
historically targeted and surveilled.
The FIPs admittedly don’t capture these relationships. They don’t
capture or protect “group privacy,” whether we mean the population-

40 Id. at 1918 (“Like the liberal self, liberal democracy has always been an ideal to be
pursued and approximated. A polity’s ability to approximate liberal democracy has both
institutional and material preconditions.”).
41 See AB 375, 2017–2018 Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(f) (Cal. 2018) (enacting The
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018) (“The unauthorized disclosure of personal
information and the loss of privacy can have devastating effects for individuals, ranging
from financial fraud, identity theft, and unnecessary costs to personal time and finances, to
destruction of property, harassment, reputational damage, emotional stress, and even
potential physical harm.”); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870,
1875 (2019).
42 See RICHARDS, supra note 17, at 22 (offering the following working definition of
privacy: “Privacy is the degree to which human information is neither known nor
used”(emphasis omitted)). For a discussion of the differences between U.S. and EU
conceptions of privacy, see id. at 17–18; Jones & Kaminski, supra note 11, at 97–101.
43 See Viljoen, supra note 2, at 606.
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level effects of demographically based surveillance and data use, or the
awfully common scenario of cameras trained primarily on
predominantly Black communities.44 Individual privacy can be a tool
of antisubordination.45 But it also leads to complicated tradeoffs and
is not the only nor necessarily the best way to accomplish
antisubordination goals.
So. None of this is to say that we shouldn’t regulate the bad acts
we know about—that we shouldn’t make companies design less
invasive technologies and prohibit population-level discrimination and
the exploitation of particularly vulnerable or historically marginalized
groups. We should do all those things! To an individual, data privacy
harms may feel deeply individual. But to a company, an individual is a
data widget, among many data widgets: a set of eyeballs and a wallet
and some demographic traits. If we’re going to be treated and
manipulated and manufactured like widgets, companies should be
regulated like widget-makers, for sure.
It’s this duality of personal data—widget in the one sense,
selfhood in another (and if we really want to get complicated, speech
antecedent in a third, but more on that in a moment)—that makes
regulating it so complex. And it’s the duality of personal data that we
may be able to harness to get the kinds of privacy laws scholars now call
for. Because people care about their selves. Widget making is less
interesting. What motivates the enactment of data privacy laws—
what’s motivating the enactment of data privacy laws right now—is an
individual’s experience of feeling like her personal information is out
of her control.46 That is, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)
isn’t about widgets and widget makers and capital or even

44 See, e.g., Chaz Arnett, Race, Surveillance, Resistance, 81 OHIO STATE L.J. 1103, 1110
(2020); Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 425, 429 (2017)
(observing the harms of group surveillance).
45 Scott Skinner-Thompson, Agonistic Privacy & Equitable Democracy, 131 YALE L.J.F.
454, 457 (2021) (“[W]hile privacy scholars have underscored privacy’s ability to enable
participation, members of marginalized groups have used privacy itself to create agonist,
participatory friction.”); see also SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, PRIVACY AT THE MARGINS 103
(2021) (discussing surveillance as a tool of subordination).
46 See AB 375, 2017–2018 Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(g)–(h) (Cal. 2018) (enacting The
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018):
(g) In March 2018, it came to light that tens of millions of people had their
personal data misused by a data mining firm called Cambridge Analytica. A series
of congressional hearings highlighted that our personal information may be
vulnerable to misuse when shared on the Internet. As a result, our desire for
privacy controls and transparency in data practices is heightened.
(h) People desire privacy and more control over their information. California
consumers should be able to exercise control over their personal information,
and they want to be certain that there are safeguards against misuse of their
personal information.
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discrimination—it’s about inalienable rights.47 And inalienable rights,
for better or for worse, belong to individuals.48
Perhaps one reason U.S. scholars feel so ready to shift away from
the individual rights framework is that we haven’t constitutionalized
data privacy on this side of the Atlantic. If we only had a federal
constitutional right to data privacy that applied to both governmental
and nongovernmental actors! In Europe, data privacy is a human
right.49 It’s in the EU Charter.50 It has been read into the European
Convention on Human Rights.51 It’s muddled, and fuzzy, and
intertwined with other conceptions of privacy, and involves balancing
tests that are confusing to most Americans, to be sure. But the core of
the data privacy right is a fundamental human right that belongs to an
individual. To get rid of this core is to get rid of the foundation for
the whole apparatus, including the detailed widget regulation.
While we may not have a federal constitutional right to data
privacy, we now for the first time have state laws that instantiate similar
rights through legislation. And these laws draw a through-line from
state constitutional privacy rights to these newly legislated data privacy
rights. Both the CCPA and the Colorado Privacy Act are framed by
preambles touting the existence of a privacy right in each respective
state constitution. Each law’s preamble explains that now is the time
to update those rights to address privacy harms in the data analytics
age.52
Whether they’re constitutional rights or not, data privacy rights
sound in fundamental rights rhetoric. They also do more than that,
even here in the United States. Data privacy rights offer a potentially
powerful defense on the battleground of constitutional analysis.
Because as most know, the First Amendment as currently interpreted
poses a significant threat to data privacy laws. Characterizing data
privacy as an individual right can, as a number of us have now noted,
47 See id. § 2(a) (“In 1972, California voters amended the California Constitution to
include the right of privacy among the ‘inalienable’ rights of all people. . . . Fundamental
to this right of privacy is the ability of individuals to control the use, including the sale, of
their personal information.”).
48 See Colorado Privacy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1302(a)(I) (2021) (“The people
of Colorado regard their privacy as a fundamental right and an essential element of their
individual freedom.”).
49 See Jones & Kaminski, supra note 11 at 103.
50 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 7–8, Dec. 12, 2000,
2000 O.J. (C 364) 10.
51 European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5; see also
Gloria González Fuster & Serge Gutwirth, Opening Up Personal Data Protection: A Conceptual
Controversy, 29 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 531, 536 (2013).
52 See Colorado Privacy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1302(a)(II) (2021) (“Colorado’s
constitution explicitly provides the right to privacy under section 7 of article II, and
fundamental privacy rights have long been, and continue to be, integral to protecting
Coloradans and to safeguarding our democratic republic[.]”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
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place First Amendment interests on both sides of the equation.53
Unchecked surveillance causes chilling effects (on individuals). It
leads to the depletion of minority views (held by individuals). It causes
individuals to avoid reading controversial material, to avoid
participating in democracy. If we drop the individual cast of data
privacy law, we maybe win the battle over getting more substantive
regulation into legislation. (A big maybe). But we do so at the cost of
potentially losing the First Amendment war.
This Essay closes with what might at first feel like a detour: an
analysis of privacy regulation through the lens of institutional design.
It turns out that even if individuals are faulty decisionmakers, and even
if individual rights are rarely exercised, and even if we all agree that
the right unit of analysis for data privacy law is social or the group,
individual rights can still do things that government regulation alone
cannot. That is, individual rights can be complimentary to regulation.
This is a lesson as old as administrative law.54
In a perfect world, what does regulatory data privacy law look like?
That is, data privacy law that isn’t centered on the individual. (To be
clear, a full answer to this is well beyond the scope of this Essay.) It
probably starts with some bans: you can’t gather x types of info, can’t
conduct info-gathering under y circumstances, or can’t use data in z
ways. So, legislators or regulators come up with some bans, which aim
to protect particular practices (like communications), relationships
(like doctor-patient), spaces (like homes), information (like sexual
information), or vulnerable parties (like children). (We’ll leave aside
for now the potential First Amendment implications of any of this.)
Then they come up with exceptions to the bans. Then they
mandate some design elements (like prominent visceral notice and
clear consent streams), while prohibiting others (like dark patterns).
Maybe they institute licensing requirements: you can’t process or use
personal data without approval of your practices by a regulator.55 Your
license is conditional: you can only process and use data under certain
circumstances. It must be reviewed and renewed every few years. And
it’s revocable: you have to stop processing data if you exceed your
license or do something wrong. An enforcing agency probably
53 See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 37, at 203 (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized
that protecting this kind of privacy is itself often protective of free expression. First
Amendment interests, in other words, arise on both sides.”); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane
Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling
Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 466–67 (2015); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 387, 393–407 (2008).
54 See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation
Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48 (2018).
55 See Frank Pasquale, Licensure as Data Governance, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT
COLUM. UNIV. (Sept. 28, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/licensure-as-datagovernance [https://perma.cc/PR4A-JDDN].
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conducts rulemaking to get public input into clarifying everything (the
bans, the exceptions, the design requirements, the licensing
standards), and maybe issues ongoing cyclical guidance in
consultation with a variety of stakeholders. Then they build up a huge,
costly, expert enforcement apparatus, monitor the market for
wrongdoings, and impose big sanctions when they happen. What’s so
wrong with this plan?
Well, first, it won’t happen. If we look at the other aspect of recent
data privacy laws, the part that regulates rather than relies on
individual rights, we see that the counterfactual isn’t this (to some)
ideal. The counterfactual, even in Europe, is impact assessments:
internal enterprise risk management constructed around vague and
contestable standards.56 Not clearly articulated bans (or, at least, not
many of them).57 Not licensing. Don’t get me wrong: done well,
there’s lots to like about impact assessments and risk mitigation backed
by substantive design standards and human rights.58 I want companies
to be forced to think about a technology’s impact on human rights
before they deploy it. I want them to have to build things differently
and take the public good into account. I’d love them to get audited
and monitored and have reporting requirements. All of that would be
leaps and bounds above the current state of play in the United States,
including in new data privacy laws.59 But it’s not the data privacy

56 See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1604–05 (2019) (discussing impact
assessments in the GDPR); Colorado Privacy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1301 to 1313
(2021); Consumer Data Privacy Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-571 to 581 (2021); Cohen, How
(Not) to Write a Privacy Law, supra note 1.
57 An exception is a proposed law in the state of Washington, as discussed in Margot
E. Kaminski, Regulating the Risks of AI (Feb. 14, 2022) (working paper) (on file with
author); see also SB 5116, 2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2022).
58 See Andrew D. Selbst, An Institutional View of Algorithmic Impact Assessments, 35 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 117 (2021); Margot E Kaminski & Gianclaudio Malgieri, Algorithmic Impact
Assessments Under the GDPR: Producing Multi-Layered Explanations, 11 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 125
(2021); Jacob Metcalf, Emanuel Moss, Elizabeth Anne Watkins, Ranjit Singh & Madeleine
Clare Elish, Algorithmic Impact Assessments and Accountability: The Co-Construction of Impacts, in
ACM CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 735 (2021);
Emanuel Moss, Elizabeth Anne Watkins, Jacob Metcalf & Madeleine Clare Elish, Governing
with Algorithmic Impact Assessments: Six Observations, in AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics,
and Society 1010 (2021); EMANUEL MOSS, ELIZABETH ANNE WATKINS, RANJIT SINGH,
MADELEINE CLAIRE ELISH & JACOB METCALF, DATA & SOC’Y, ASSEMBLING ACCOUNTABILITY:
ALGORITHMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENTS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2021).
59 Chander et al., supra note 15, at 1750 (pointing out that while most proposed U.S.
privacy laws have some version of the FIPs, they lack the accountability and governance half
of the GDPR). Newer laws like Colorado’s and Virginia’s, modeled after Washington’s, lean
in on a lite version of impact assessments, but again lack the GDPR’s required structure;
central regulator; history of regulation; backstop constitutional court; and many, many,
many procedural and substantive details.
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regime most scholars dream of. It’s just the data privacy regime we are
most likely to get.
Second, even if a more top-down version of regulatory privacy
were enacted, it would still lack some of the benefits that individual
rights could provide. It wouldn’t let individuals make their own
choices or opt out. It would be one-size-fits-most. It wouldn’t
compensate individuals for individual harms or correct those harms
once they occur. It wouldn’t provide civil recourse for individuals: a
way for them to identify what’s been done specifically to them and be
listened to, acknowledged, and recognized. And it would miss out on
potentially important policy feedback. That is, individual claims,
whether made through litigation or otherwise, can afford
opportunities to change policy going forward. Environmental
regulatory standards came out of litigation;60 so did safety standards for
cars.61 Because this is the thing about individual rights: they can be, in
fact often are, complementary to regulation, not in opposition to it. If
we can’t get the institutions exactly right—can’t force companies to
consult impacted stakeholders, or get regulators to ignore a flood of
industry input—then individual rights offer another way in.
Last, and far from least, individual data privacy rights with their
emphasis on notice and access potentially offer us transparency onto
patterns and practices we currently cannot see. That has regulatory
value. It informs, even drives, new policymaking. It allows input by
stakeholders who might otherwise not be at the table. It potentially
holds companies publicly accountable and prevents or mitigates
capture. This still matters even if we get command-and-control privacy
regulation (which we won’t). Because even if we get more top-down
privacy law, there will still be delegation to companies. It’s the nature
of the beast. No technology-neutral omnibus law can get by with
writing rules on absolutely everything. Maybe no law can, period. So
unless we replace that source of oversight with something else (and
there’s little sign of appetite for, say, publicly releasing impact
assessments62), we forego the not inconsiderable potential benefits of
having more information.
Information imbalances are power
imbalances, right?
We may be able to design a version of regulatory privacy that gets
us many of the touted but unrealized benefits of individual rights. I’m
not confident that we could get it enacted. I’m not confident that if it
were enacted, it wouldn’t get watered down or even captured. I am
confident that there is more to individual rights than we currently give
them credit for, especially if they are well executed.

60
61
62

See Kysar, supra note 54, at 49.
See Bryan H. Choi, Crashworthy Code, 94 WASH L. REV. 39, 87 (2019).
See Kaminski, supra note 57.
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Maybe it’s not that individual rights will inevitably fail, but that we
have not made them strong enough. Maybe we have not put enough
thought into structuring incentives for people to use them. Maybe
there is a reason that so much energy has gone into the détente over
whether data privacy laws should be enforceable through a private
right of action.63 Maybe there is something to constitutionalizing, to
talking in terms of rights and not economic choice or consent. And
maybe, even if you don’t agree with any of this, there is still value to
thinking about how to design and implement the individual rights we
now have so that they better work towards overall governance goals.
Just imagine if we could actually say no. Wait, Apple has: and a
reported 96% of individuals opted out of targeted tracking.64 Meta’s
stock dropped more than 25%.65 So much for individual rights.

63 See Lauren Henry Scholz, Private Rights of Action in Privacy Law, 63 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1639 (2022).
64 Samuel Axon, 96% of US Users Opt Out of App Tracking in iOS 14.5, Analytics Find,
ARS TECHNICA (May 7, 2021), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/05/96-of-us-usersopt-out-of-app-tracking-in-ios-14-5-analytics-find/
[https://perma.cc/D85E-8L3Q].
Thanks to Meg Jones for a conversation regarding this number.
65 Carly Olson, Meta Rivalry with Apple Inflamed as Facebook Parent Company Share Price
Plummets, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022
/feb/04/meta-rivalry-apple-inflamed-facebook-parent-company-share-price-plummets [htt
ps://perma.cc/6BLQ-8MUF] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).

